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This article aims to reconcile tensions around ‘the Anthropocene’ by reviewing and 
integrating the discourses on the new geological epoch. It is argued that the 
Anthropocene discourses based on natural and social sciences are complementary. 
The anthropogenic epoch detrimental to the Earth’s biodiversity, however, does not 
reduce to any discourse. Instead of calling to reject discourses that do not accept this 
limitation of language or alternatively do not show sensitivity to contextual matters, 
the article demonstrates how different Anthropocene discourses can be combined. 
The study concludes that in order to exit the epoch, anthropocentric discourses on 
the Anthropocene remain ineffective unless complemented by non-anthropocentric 
discourses. 
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The consequences of human dominance and exploitation of ecosystems have been 
recognised for decades (e.g., McKibben, 1989; Meadows et al., 1972; 2005). The 
recent debate on the Anthropocene illuminates this imbalance in the biosphere, the 
global sum of ecosystems. The scientific evidence on anthropogenic influence is 
more robust and alarming than ever, suggesting that humans have become a 
geological force (see Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000). While ecological degradation has 
occurred with undesired consequences for numerous past civilisations throughout 
recorded human history (Hornborg, 2011; Tainter, 2015), ‘the Anthropocene’ 
conveys a different message. Never before has the scale of the human-induced 
destruction affected the living conditions of almost all earthbound beings (Steffen et 
al., 2015b; Heikkurinen, 2017). Human power and weight in the biosphere are no 
longer fearmongering about the end of the world, but an empirical fact. In the present 
ecological crisis, ecosystems are being pushed outside safe boundaries with 
catastrophic consequences for the anthropos, as well as for the non-human world 
(Barnosky et al., 2012; Steffen et al., 2015a). 
 
The natural scientific discourses on the Anthropocene have importantly stressed the 
causes and consequences of anthropogenic changes in ecosystems and the 
biosphere. In these discourses, humankind is often analysed as the main unit. Owing 
to this unit of analysis (extra-humankind), the discourse has increased our 
understanding of humans in relation to non-humans. The Anthropocene discourses 
rooted in social sciences and humanities, again, have examined the causes and 
consequence of the ecological crisis within humankind. By doing so, they have 
produced valuable knowledge on the contextual particularities of the Anthropocene. 
On the one hand, these include studies on who within the human species are the 
main culprits of ecological damage, and on the other hand, how equally the costs 
are distributed. This unit of analysis (intra-humankind) has led especially to the 
study of the regional, cultural, and class differences of the Anthropocene.  
 
The social science-based Anthropocene discourses are often seen to be on a crash 
course with the natural science behind the Anthropocene. Our argument is that the 
relevance of both of these discourses should be acknowledged so as not to continue 
the Kuhnian paradigm war (see Kuhn, [1962] 2012). We claim that any further 
widening of the divide between natural and social sciences would be 
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counterproductive to advancing an urgently needed interdisciplinary understanding 
on how to exit the Anthropocene epoch. Complex problems, such as the ecological 
crisis, cannot be addressed by a single paradigm or systems level, but require an 
interdisciplinary approach (Voinov and Farley, 2007; Brandt et al., 2013; Clayton 
and Radcliffe, 2015). 
 
As the anthropogenic epoch is detrimental to the diversity of life on Earth, we must 
exit the Anthropocene. But how? The discourses regarding the epoch all have their 
strengths and weaknesses for this task. For instance, discourses that importantly 
highlight power imbalances in the biosphere between species also reduce 
humankind to a single unit, a collective agent. By doing so, they fail to analyse the 
power differences within humans. The critics of these extra-humankind discourses 
have conducted important analyses on particularities within humankind (e.g.  Malm 
and Hornborg, 2014; Moore, 2015; Swyngedouw and Ernstson, 2018). They have 
persuasively claimed that humanity, as a whole, has never been an agent, but it has 
rather been a small and powerful minority of humans, and a particular economic 
organisation, which have led ‘us’ to the Anthropocene. 
 
Instead of making an argument in favour of either natural or social sciences, this 
article aims to reconcile the tensions about ‘the Anthropocene’ by reviewing the 
discourses on the new geological epoch, and distinguishing them from the epoch 
itself. The contribution is two-fold. Firstly, the study converges the competing 
Anthropocene discourses by showing their complementarity. Secondly, the study 
makes a separation between Anthropocene discourses and the epoch – the 
anthropogenic biophysical processes not captured by or reduced to any talk or text 
on these processes. It is proposed that the urgently needed exit from the epoch will 
be supported by collaboration between disciplines and approaches. This 
convergence in the discourses could pave the way for effective sustainable change. 
 
The article begins by presenting the new geological epoch and discourse about it. 
We conceptualise the Anthropocene as a contested notion encompassing both an 
understanding of the Anthropocene as an anthropogenic geological epoch, as well as 
a view of the Anthropocene as discourses (Section 2). The article proceeds to 
examining the logic of capital accumulation, as economic organisations based on 
growth and productivism are identified as one of the main reasons behind the 
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Anthropocene epoch (Section 3). Before the concluding remarks, the article 
discusses the possibilities of exiting the Anthropocene epoch (Section 4). 
 
 
2. The Anthropocene 
 
2.1. The epoch and discourses about it 
 
Since its introduction by the atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen and biologist Eugene 
Stoermer (2000), the term Anthropocene has become rather popular. In addition to 
the stratigraphic evidence of a geological epoch (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000; 
Steffen et al., 2015a; Waters et al., 2016), the Anthropocene has produced several 
discourses about it (e.g. Malm and Hornborg, 2014; Di Chiro, 2016). Accordingly, 
the Anthropocene can signify both the epoch and the discourses about it. By ‘epoch’, 
the article refers to the actual (and ‘real’ in ontological terms) geological changes on 
Earth, while ‘discourses’ refer to the linguistic method of human communication 
(talk, debate, writing, research, etc.) regarding these geological changes and/or how 
they are understood in a wider socio-economic and ecological frame. 
 
The definition of the Anthropocene is rooted in natural sciences, where it refers to 
the “geology of mankind”. It describes a shift from the previous geological epoch, 
the Holocene, to a time where humans have become a geological force (Crutzen, 
2002: 23). This signifies that the undesired changes in the climate system, as well as 
the loss of biodiversity, are no longer naturally occurring but are anthropogenic, or 
human-induced. While the understanding of the Anthropocene as an epoch is 
persuasive and correct, social scientists and humanists, such as Baskin (2015), Malm 
and Hornborg (2014), Moore (2015), Lövbrand et al., (2015), Bauer and Ellis (2018) 
and Swyngedouw and Ernstson (2018) have criticised, not the actual occurrence of 
the anthropogenic impacts on the biosphere, but rather the proposed name of the 
epoch and its underlying assumptions. The critique mainly targets how human beings 
(the anthropos) are understood in the Anthropocene as the locus of the ecological 
devastation. In other words, the critics question the relevance of considering 
humankind as the agent that has caused, and continues to cause, the undesired 
changes in the biosphere. Furthermore, they ponder how aware the natural science-
based Anthropocene discourses actually are of this implicit assumption, as well as 
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its political implications, of humans acting as a collective agent. While it is true that 
the natural-science led discourse is factual – it has been, and continues to be humans, 
and not birds or fish that have mainly caused the changes in the biosphere – it is also 
true that humans have not produced these impacts as a collective agent. 
 
Owing to the observation that historically the positive and negative effects of 
industrialisation have been very unequally “distributed among social categories 
within the human species” (Hornborg, 2015: 62), the critics of the extra-humankind 
discourse consider these questions extremely relevant. More specifically, it is 
claimed that there is a temporal and spatial separation or disconnect between 
consumption and where the ecological consequences are most heavily felt (Harvey, 
1996). Accordingly, it is claimed that such discourses do little to foster the political 
action necessary to tackle the ecological destruction taking place beyond a global, 
flawed technocratic form of governance (see Hamilton, 2013; Hamilton et al., 2015), 
and the natural science-based definition of the Anthropocene is consequently 
problematic. 
 
Perhaps the reason why the critics, who consider the nomenclature on the 
Anthropocene such an important issue – i.e., what to call and how to talk about the 
epoch – lies in a constructivist idea of language creating reality; at least social reality 
(see e.g. Malm, 2018). Some critics, on the other hand, argue that the argument is 
less about the term as such and more about targeting a specific understanding of 
social processes, power, and modes of organisation that are built on destructive and 
imperialist relations with the non-humans (e.g. Simpson, 2018). Moreover, the extra-
humankind discourse is claimed to be a-historic (Moore, 2015), de-politicised 
(Clark, 2015; Lövbrand et al., 2015), and de-politicising (Swyngedouw and 
Ernstson, 2018). Be that as it may, the critique calls for reflection on reasons that 
have got “us” into this mess, and consequently: what can and should be done to get 
out of it? 
 
It is of course pertinent to question whether the term ‘Anthropocene’ is based on a 
narrow worldview offering only a limited normative guide to action; or even worse, 
that it may leave the prescription implicit behind the hegemonic understanding of 
what should be done (Malm and Hornborg, 2014; Hornborg, 2015; Di Chiro, 2016). 
For instance, under the current dominance of positivist techno-science and 
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capitalism, solutions to the problems of the Anthropocene epoch might even 
justifiably be sought in geoengineering (Clark, 2015; Hamilton, 2013). After all, 
depending on the underlying ontological and epistemological perspectives, not only 
are different responses proffered, but different problems are perceived. Hence, a 
universalising Anthropocene discourse could also be taken as an attempt to put 
forward or reproduce the techno-scientific worldview. In this light, the 
Anthropocene resembles a paradigm rather than merely a new geological epoch 
(Baskin, 2015), and therefore, in defining the Anthropocene, it is important to 
include other discursive variants. 
 
2.2. Variations in the Anthropocene discourses 
 
The start date of the anthropogenic geological epoch was the subject of debate even 
before the Anthropocene discourses commenced. The birth of the epoch divides the 
Anthropocene discourse broadly into two other and separate ontological and 
epistemological camps: the so-called good Anthropocene and the bad Anthropocene 
(Dalby, 2016; Hamilton, 2016; Kunnas, 2017). According to the advocates of the 
good Anthropocene discourse, the epoch began as early as 8,000 years ago, when 
humans started clearing forests and farming (e.g., Ruddiman, 2003). Philosophically, 
this fits well with the so-called flat ontology (and other borderless metaphysics) that 
considers industry and technology as inherent parts of nature (e.g. Haraway, 2015; 
Latour, 2002).  
 
The bad Anthropocene discourse in contrast proclaims that the epoch began with the 
rapid industrialisation and technologisation of the mid- to late-eighteenth century 
(e.g. Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000). According to this discourse that considers the 
epoch as something undesired, there was a point in history when the human species’ 
impact on the ecosystems became globally noticeable (for a debate on the marker, 
see Lewis and Maslin, 2015). Indeed, the bad Anthropocene association can be 
challenged from the relational perspective (e.g., Haraway, 2015; Latour, 2002), 
which asserts that it is impossible to mark a time in history pinpointing the beginning 
of significant human influence on the Earth, as humans and non-human actors are so 
tightly interconnected (Davies, 2016). If, however, everything (or alternatively 
nothing) is considered to be natural, it is difficult to make an argument for sustainable 




What is important for the present enquiry is that while it can be claimed that the bad 
Anthropocene is too practical and arrogant with its realist ontology and objectivist 
epistemology, the vision of the good Anthropocene must also incorporate a large 
dose of technological optimism (and perhaps even hubris) suggesting that humans 
can and should control the biosphere (see Baskin, 2015; Hamilton, 2013). On this 
tug-of-war over the beginning of the epoch, Hamilton (2013: 202-203) comments 
that: 
 
if humans have been a planetary force since civilization emerged […], then there is nothing 
fundamentally new about the last couple of centuries of industrialism. It is in the nature of civilized 
humans to transform the Earth, including by the use of geoengineering, and what is in the nature of the 
species cannot be resisted. By focusing attention on ‘humankind’ in general rather than forms of social 
organization that emerged more recently, the Anthropocene becomes in some sense natural. It is not the 
product of industrial rapaciousness, an unregulated market, human alienation from nature or excessive 
faith in technological power; it is merely the result of humans doing what humans are meant to do. 
 
Malm and Hornborg (2014: 65) highlight this as the main paradox of the 
Anthropocene discourse, since the anthropogenic changes are at one moment 
denaturalised – relocated from the sphere of natural causes to that of human activities 
– only to be re-naturalised in the next, when derived from an innate human trait, such 
as the ability to control fire. It follows that it is not nature as a whole but human 
nature that is at work here: “The question of fire-use and of the destructiveness of 
the human species seems a huge one to foist on a tiny lyric, a breach of decorum and 
scale of a kind endemic to the Anthropocene” (Clark, 2015: 61). This cultural 
pessimism might be one of the main reasons that many social scientists are not fond 
of the using the term ‘Anthropocene’. Other social scientists, such as Clark (2015), 
Hamilton et al. (2015), and Heikkurinen (2017), on the other hand, continue to 
actively use and take part in the Anthropocene discourses by employing the term so 
as not to lose sight of the actual anthropogenic epoch, even though they clearly share 









A consensus within the scientific community is emerging that the severe 
anthropogenic impacts on the biosphere began to materialise somewhere between 
1610 and 1964 (Lewis and Maslin, 2015). Of course, the process started much 
earlier, making both the bad and good Anthropocene relevant viewpoints. “[T]he 
mastery of fire by our ancestors provided humankind with a powerful monopolistic 
tool unavailable to other species, that put us firmly on the long path towards the 
Anthropocene” (Steffen et al., 2007: 614). This notion, however, does not refute 
industrial revolution as a significant point in time. That is, it contains within it 
criticism not only of the economic organisation, but also of human nature. With the 
use of exosomatic tools, humans have become very distinct from other species 
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1975) causing Clark (2015: 61) to coin the notion of “the ape 
of fire playing with fire.” Affairs certainly did change in the biosphere when humans 
learned to master fire and burn non-human objects for their benefit; first wood, later 
coal, and then oil and gas. As Clark (2015: 60) notes, “fire is an instance of a human 
tool that has physically altered the very physiology of the species as well as its 
behaviour”. 
 
One issue with this view, however, stems from progress becoming understood and 
presented as something natural and inevitable; a common journey taken by the entire 
human species irrespective of differences in geographical regions, cultures, 
civilisations, or class interests. It goes without saying that humans did not 
collectively deliberate on the questions of technology, such as whether the species 
should use fire and tools to further progress. For instance, only a fraction of 
humanity, even in affluent parts of the world such as Great Britain and Belgium, 
were able to install steam engines in their factories (Malm, 2013; 2016). The fossil 
fuel economy, the main form of human organisation that has led us to the new 
geological epoch, was from the very start based on highly inequitable processes and 
was unequally distributed among the social classes in the world-system, which in 
fact can also be seen as a requirement for the existence of modern fossil fuel 
economies and technologies (Hornborg, 2001; 2016; Malm, 2016). 
 
This means that the anthropogenic changes in the biosphere are also sociogenic, 
pertaining to a specific social order. That is, the driver of change is not merely 
humans as a species, but also specific social power relations and structures, and 
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forms of economic organisation (Bauer and Ellis, 2018; Di Chiro, 2016; Lövbrand 
et al., 2015; Malm and Hornborg, 2014; Moore, 2015).  
 
To describe these reasons for social change, Hornborg (2015) and Malm and 
Hornborg (2014) propose that the new epoch with technology as its main change 
agent should be called the Technocene. Then again, one could ask do animals not 
also use tools and technology, and which technologies should mark the beginning of 
a new epoch: iPods, steam engines, wheels, fire? Another label proposed for the 
contemporary age is the Plutocene (Ulvila and Wilén, 2017). The concept stems 
from the Greek word ploutos that refers to wealth, matched with the observation that 
most of the material consumption, energy use and greenhouse gas emissions can be 
attributed to the richest segment of humanity (Ulvila and Wilén, 2017). Moore 
(2014a; 2014b; 2015) has argued for the use of the concept of the Capitalocene 
(originally coined by Andreas Malm), as it emphasises the current new epoch as the 
age of capital. In a similar vein, Norgaard (2013; 2014; 2015) suggests the 
Econocene as a proper term, due to the almost religious status of the economy and 
economism in many contemporary societies, and because global market activity 
“increased 50-fold, or more than 16-fold per capita” during the twentieth century 
(Norgaard, 2014: 44).  
 
Here again one might ask whether the critique of economic structures delves deeply 
enough. Is there nothing really pertaining to human nature? Is the undesired 
development merely an unsuccessful social construction? Replacing the term 
‘Anthropocene’ with a more accurate one might offer a way out of the unfair, 
universalising blame and responsibility of the past and present ecological damage. 
But then again, successful exit from the imperfect Anthropocene term will not take 
“us” away from the anthropogenic epoch. The impacts of humans will remain, no 
matter what we choose to call them, and it seems that there is no single cause behind 
the ecological crisis. 
 
Despite the prevailing inaccuracies and contradictions, it is important not to get 
caught up in the technical details about the exact start date of the epoch, or 
alternatively in arguments about the meaningfulness of the term ‘Anthropocene’. 
Many of the disputes between the proponents and critics of different Anthropocene 
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discourses are due to the different units of analysis, that is, emphasising e.g. intra- or 
extra-humankind relations (Heikkurinen, 2017).  
 
To advance the understanding of how to exit the epoch, it is certainly worthwhile 
complementing the natural science discourses with the discourses from social 
science and humanities. In the next section, the article examines the economics of 
the Anthropocene. As capitalism roughly co-occurs with the birth of the epoch 
(Lewis and Maslin, 2015), it is worthwhile having a particular focus on this 
hegemonic mode of economic organisation. 
 
 




Capitalism has historically been a very flexible way of organising the economy and 
has adapted to various forms of social settings (e.g., Arrighi, 2010; Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2005; Moore, 2015). It has also been successful in appropriating 
opposition and resistance as a form of creative raw material to utilise in re-inventing 
itself (Crouch, 2004; Negri and Hardt, 2000; Streeck, 2012; 2017), in which 
discourses about ecology have not been an exception (Böhm et al., 2012; Kenis and 
Lievens, 2015; Kenis and Mathijs, 2014). 
 
This constant shape-shifting renders the task of outlining a specific definition of 
capitalism somewhat arduous. Nevertheless, it is clear that the concept of capitalism 
clearly derives from capital1. For Marx ([1867] 1973), capital – referring to 
accumulated material wealth – is the key element in understanding capitalism. When 
analysed in a specific historical context, capital acquires a more specific definition. 
For instance, Wallerstein (2003: 13) explains that capital “is not just the stock of 
consumable goods, machinery, or authorized claims, or material things in the form 
of money,” and elaborates further as follows: 
                                                            
1 In this article, we conceptualize capitalism mainly through capital, because we perceive that expansive capital 
accumulation (which is the underlying feature of productivist organization of economies more generally) is the 
main driver of the different sorts of capitalist organization (liberal, authoritarian, state-led, etc.). In doing so, we do 
not wish to downplay other signifying features of capitalism, such as commodity production for an external body 
or wage-labour and class society, but to focus on the one we think is the most significant to the argument put 




[I]n this historical system capital came to be used (invested) in a very special way. It came to be used 
with the primary objective or intent of self-expansion. In this system, past accumulations were ‘capital’ 
only to the extent they were used to accumulate more of the same... It was this relentless and curiously 
self-regarding goal of the holder of capital, the accumulation of still more capital, and the relations this 
holder of capital had therefore to establish with other persons in order to achieve this goal, which we 
denominate as capitalist. (Wallerstein, 2003: 13-14). 
 
In a capitalist society, economic actors (e.g. companies, venture capitalists, 
investors, states, or other economic organisations) organise activities through the 
fluid deployment of capital by means of investments made in a variety of surplus-
making operations (Harvey, 2014). For these operations, finance is “crucial to the 
liquidity and mobility of capital as well as to expansion and spreading costs over 
time” (Calhoun, 2013: 136). Capitalism can also be conceptualised as a historic 
formation or structure (Wallerstein, 2003; Mann, 2013), as supported by nation states 
and state institutions, transnational corporations and various international 
organisations, political arrangements and military power (Crouch, 2004; Ruuska, 
2018; Streeck, 2017) that are characterised by hierarchical and unequally integrated 
material organisations that are fundamentally all embedded in nature (Moore, 2015). 
 
More importantly, Wallerstein (2003) and Harvey (2014) argue that capital is not 
just accumulated wealth but also a process in which capital is continuously sent to 
circulate or is spent in search of more capital by those who attempt to accumulate 
more capital (see also Harvey, 2016). Following this line of thought, the current 
article conceptualises capitalism as a particular way to organise economic activities. 
In such a productivist organisation, expansive capital accumulation processes are 
hegemonic in providing and shaping the material, social, and intellectual bases for 
social life (Harvey, 2014). This process does not have an end; it exists only to 
become more of the same, which is also why the article claims that capitalism is 
sorely unsuited to helping find a way out of the Anthropocene epoch. 
 
3.2. Economic growth 
 
Most ecological problems can be traced back to economic growth (Georgescu-
Roegen, 1971; Daly, 2011; IPCC, 2014), an inherent and central feature of capitalism 
and other productivist forms of economic organization (Boltanski and Chiapello, 
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2005; Foster, 2009; Salminen and Vadén, 2015; Ruuska, 2018). The capitalistic 
economic organisation scales up so that what is true for a single capitalist is also 
largely true at a more systemic level. Capital accumulation has to continue in an 
expansive manner or the reproduction of capitalism is threatened. Consequently, as 
Harvey (2014: 222) states, “capital is always about growth and it necessarily grows 
at a compound rate”, whether it is a single economic actor trying to survive in the 
market or the capitalist economic organisation as a whole. Similarly, Magdoff and 
Foster (2011: 42) state that no-growth capitalism neither exists, nor is it desirable, 
because when capital accumulation ceases, or even slows down, an economic 
downturn or a systemic crisis ensues, which leads to unemployment, bankruptcies 
and the incurring of both private and public debt. One of the key reasons for the 
occurrence of these accumulation crises is a social contract known as return on 
investment. Graeber (2014: 332) asks, “what is ‘interest’ but the demand that that 
money never ceases to grow?” The same is true, Graeber (2014) continues, for 
investments, which are in principle capital placed in the continual pursuit of profit. 
Therefore, it is safe to say that in capitalism, economic growth is a necessity, 
meaning there is a constant pressure to accumulate wealth, make profits, enhance 
productivity, and invest in the future in order to sustain further accumulation and the 
viability of capitalist economic organisation. 
 
With regard to the ecological costs of the Anthropocene epoch, which are now 
crystal clear, Daly (1991) is known for emphasising what he calls the impossibility 
theorem, that is, the paradox between unlimited economic growth and a finite 
ecosystem (see also Georgescu-Roegen, 1975). Foster’s (2009: 15) work also 
supports this deep tension between a capitalistic mode of organisation and ecological 
crisis, as he notes: 
 
Capitalism as a world economy, divided into classes and driven by competition, embodies a logic that 
accepts no boundaries on its expansion and its exploitation of its environment. The Earth as a planet, in 
contrast, is by definition limited. This is an absolute contradiction from which there is no earthly escape. 
 
While it is clear that the human-induced geological epoch is not reducible to a single 
cause but consists of a complex bundle of problems (e.g. Foster et al., 2010, p. 15-
16), it is nevertheless commonly accepted that most ecological problems can be 
traced to the growth in economic activities leading to an expansive exploitation of 
various natural resources (IPCC, 2014; Moore, 2015). Problematically for the 
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ongoing and deepening ecological crisis (of which the Anthropocene epoch is a 
manifestation) the capitalist organisation, due to its nature, generates the need for 
limitless and indefinite growth , which clearly creates a conflict with the planet and 
its limited natural resources (Foster, 2009; Hornborg, 2014; Jackson, 2009). 
 
In capitalism, capital accumulation unfolds through the commodification of nature 
(Polanyi, 1968) and the exploitation of human and non-human labour (Moore, 2015). 
To be able to reproduce and to accumulate more capital, there needs to be an 
availability of cheap resources, and inexpensive ways and places to dump waste, but 
also a way to utilise human capital (Polanyi, 1968; Moore, 2015). The availability 
of these opportunities does not by itself produce capital as value, but it does create 
the conditions that make value creation in capitalism possible, through 
enhancements in productivity. In addition to proper social organisation and the 
availability of cheap resources and labour, the exponential growth in the amount of 
labour has been enabled by various technical inventions (Mumford, 1967), extensive 
utilisation of fossil fuels (Malm, 2016), and more broadly, the modern techno-
scientific culture (Ellul, [1954] 1976; see also Kerschner and Ehlers, 2016). 
Particularly from the perspective of ecological sustainability, capital and technology 
seem to form an unholy alliance. Especially in service of capital, technology destroys 
natural habitats due to extensive resource extraction (Foster, 2009; Heikkurinen, 
2016), but it does so in an accelerating manner. This is because the main aim of 
economic organisations in capitalism is surplus value creation and expansive capital 
accumulation in order to secure the continuation of their operations. Economic 
success is largely gained through investment in technology, as it enhances 
productivity (see Moore, 2015, p. 100). At its simplest, this means that expansive 
capital accumulation leads to more and more technology being developed and 
utilised, which leads to ever more natural resources being exploited (Foster, 2009; 
Heikkurinen, 2016). This is because technological development brings new 
investment opportunities and new possibilities to accumulate capital. Also, it is true 
that capital investments in technology lead to new technologies being developed, 
which again generate new investment opportunities to accumulate more capital. 
Thus, technological development and the need for expansive capital accumulation 





3.3. Economic power and inequality 
 
The Anthropocene epoch is closely related to economic power inequalities within 
capitalism. The global economy is hierarchically split into different stages and places 
at the centre and at the periphery, where nations, nation states, transnational 
corporations, and various agents of national and transnational capital hold different 
positions in the international division of labour, and play different roles based on 
dominance, oppression, and dependence (Foster, 2009; Levy and Egan, 2003). In the 
Anthropocene, some humans and nation states have become exceedingly affluent at 
the expense of the rest of the human population (Piketty, 2014), as well as at the cost 
of  non-humans (Jensen, 2006). This exclusive affluence of the few is also an 
outcome of the exploitation, oppression, and domination of the former colonial 
countries, which have supported the industrial or post-industrial countries with their 
supply of cheap raw materials and labour force (Hornborg, 2014).  
 
In the case of climate change, for instance, the benefits and disadvantages derived 
from capitalist organisation can be seen in the distribution of carbon emissions over 
time. The Global North, in this case not accounting for per capita intra-country 
differences, was responsible for 72.7% of the carbon dioxide emitted between 1850 
and 2008, while only hosting 18.8% of the global population (Malm and Hornborg, 
2014; see also Heede, 2014). Furthermore in 2015, the richest 10% of the global 
population were responsible for approximately 45% of CO2 emissions, while the 
poorest 50% were responsible for 13% (Chancel and Piketty, 2015). In the search 
for alternatives to capitalism, it might also be fruitful to compare socio-economic 
classes on a global scale, as they neatly illustrate a source of the Anthropocene 











Figure 1 presents four global income-based classes, Table 1 illustrates the conceptual 
basis for the classes, and Table 2 shows more specifically the locations of the 
consuming and over-consuming classes and the yearly income thresholds for these 
classes. The premise of this grouping is that income is strongly related to both the 
fulfilment of basic needs and the scale of ecological harm (Ulvila and Wilén, 2017). 
Income can thus function as a useful proxy and indicator of ecological damage. The 
four global classes identified by Ulvila and Wilén (2017) are: struggling, sustainable, 
consuming, and over-consuming. 
 
 
Table 1 The conceptual basis for the four income-based classes (Ulvila and Wilén, 2017) 
Income level Basic needs Scale of ecol. damage Name of the class 
Low Not met Small Struggling 
Moderate Met Moderate Sustainable 
High Met Significant Consuming 




Accordingly, an effective idea for moving out of the epoch would have a far greater 
impact when applied to an income-based understanding of the socio-economic 
alternatives. As Ulvila and Wilén (2017) suggest, empowerment – where the poor 
would have the right to natural resources on which they depend, the right to have 
basic needs met through their own efforts whenever possible, and the right to an 
equal say in matters that affect their lives through the political process – is the only 
feasible and just option for organising the lives of those living at or below 
subsistence levels.  
 
 
Table 2 Number of people belonging to the consuming and over-consuming classes in 
regions or large countries around the year 2013 (millions) with related rounded income 
thresholds. 
 










North America 5 850 105 14 280 211 
EU 6 160 268 13 780 141 
China 2 730 370 6 660 59 
Russia & Central Asia 5 900 80 14 610 44 
Other rich countries 7 080 64 17 280 51 
Mid.East & N.Africa 6 510 78 16 660 31 
Latin America 10 330 47 23 980 36 
India 5 600 25 14 400 13 
Sub-Saharan Africa 5 520 22 11 050 9 
Other developing Asian 
countries 5 600 68 14 400 34 
World  1 127  629 
 
Source: Ulvila and Wilén, 2017 (data from Chancel and Piketty, 2015) 
 
 
A significant proportion of the global population lives on a sustainable basis. 
Therefore, if the growth imperative were to be removed, they could continue their 
lives with this material standard, in a steady-state fashion (see Daly, 1991). However, 
for the majority of citizens in the Global North, that is, the over-consuming segment 
of humanity, a degrowth organisation (see Kallis et al., 2012; Latouche, [2007] 2009) 
would be necessary to reduce the ecological damage significantly (Ulvila and Wilén, 
2017). Proposals addressing over-consumption by the rich could for example include 
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establishing a maximum income through high progressive income tax rates or laws 
limiting the highest salaries in comparison with the lowest ones, for example at the 
ratio of 5:1 or 10:1 (Ulvila and Wilén, 2017). 
 
Certainly, these economic power imbalances and inequalities at the global level take 
time to change for a more just and sustainable organisation. This becomes clear when 
looking at the current situation, where the consuming and over-consuming classes 
benefit from a continuous ecologically unequal exchange (Hornborg, 2011), while 
simultaneously functioning as role models for many, something to strive for; become 
an over-consumer! Indeed, capitalism depends not only on the ever-increasing 
amount of natural resources turned into raw materials and technologies (Moore, 
2015) and flexible and uncertain labour conditions (Crouch, 2004), but also on 
compliant human subjects as particles of mass consumerism (Streeck, 2012; 2017). 
 
These figures and tables demonstrate again that the Anthropocene epoch is not only 
driven by humanity as a whole, but especially and particularly by a small group of 
wealthy organizations and individuals (see also Vitali et al., 2011). As Schumpeter 
predicted in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy ([1942] 1950), the capitalist 
organisation of economies has led to a form of corporatism, where transnational 
corporations steer and influence public decision-making and possess much of the 
global wealth (see also Robinson, 2014). This suggests that clearing a path out of the 
Anthropocene must involve addressing how to dismantle or turn away from the 
prevailing capitalist economy based on growth and productivism with a focus on the 
over-consuming classes and societies. This change is not of course limited to 
capitalism, but includes other productivist organisations geared towards economic 
growth, as Daly and Cobb (1994: 12-13) remark: 
 
Although industrialism grew up historically under capitalist institutions, it has proven to be compatible 
with socialist institutions as well. The conflict between capitalism and socialism is not about the 
desirability or possibility of industrialism. That is taken for granted by both sides. The conflict is over 
which economic system can better produce a growing quantity of goods and services and equitably 
spread the benefits of the industrial mode of production. Whatever their ideological differences both 
systems are fully committed to large-scale, factory-style energy and capital-intensive, specialized 
production units that are hierarchically managed. They also rely heavily on nonrenewable resources 







4.1. How to exit the epoch? 
 
The review and analysis conducted in this article suggest that the current 
organisation of the economy, largely defined by economic growth and productivism, 
have led us to the Anthropocene epoch. Essentially, this finding signifies that exiting 
the concurrent destructive epoch must involve abandoning capitalism, but also other 
forms of productivist organisations. In this sense, Clark raises an important issue 
(2015: 2-3): 
 
It is not now enough to identify modern capitalism as the exclusive agent of environmental violence. 
Aside from the fact that socialist systems of government have also had appalling environmental records, 
the processes culminating in the Anthropocene include events that predate the advent of capitalism, 
primarily the invention of agriculture, deforestation and the eradication over centuries of large 
mammals in all continents beyond Africa as humanity expanded across the globe. 
 
It seems therefore that unfortunately, the most prominent historical alternatives to 
capitalism neither offer easy fixes to the prevailing ecological destruction nor a way 
out of the Anthropocene. For example, most streams of “Marxism and neo-Marxism 
do not reject industry and technology, but only their capitalistic organization” 
(Severino, [1982] 2016: 6). Such anti-capitalism is important, but arguably not 
sufficient to drive the required transformation of the economy. As Severino remarks 
([1982] 2016: 6-7): 
 
The communist revolution simply replaces the capitalistic with a socialistic organization of technology, 
while both forms of organization share that meaning which reality—which the “thing”—assumes 
within technology itself. And today it is within this meaning—within the project of the production and 
destruction of all things—that any attempt to render technological civilization less inhuman must be 
made. Socialist humanism and ecology do not advocate the abolition of this project—they simply affirm 
that, if rendered more rational, it would become more efficient and more in keeping with the essential 
values of the day. 
 
Accordingly, in addition to the need to dismantle the capitalistic and other forms of 
productivist economic organisations (Heikkurinen et al., 2019), there is a 
requirement to go beyond the faith in progress and rationalist techno-scientific 
solutions (Hamilton et al., 2015; Heidegger, [1952-1962] 1977; von Wright, 1978) 
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in the Anthropocene discourses. Ultimately, this signifies that those assumptions that 
place confidence in human skills and capabilities to master the Earth or create a good 
Anthropocene epoch are questionable (cf. Bannon, 2014; Hamilton, 2013). This 
discourse is anthropocentric, considering humans as exceptional beings above all 
other forms of life and the only source of intrinsic value (White, 1967; Næss, [1974] 
1989; Purser et al., 1995). As these premises are of limited use in the search for an 
ecological form of economics and organisation (Gosling and Case, 2013; Ezzamel 
and Willmott, 2014; Purser et al., 1995; Starik and Rands, 1995; Heikkurinen et al., 
2016), the revolution that scholarly work calls for must be complemented by an ethos 
that reaches beyond anthropocentric discourses (Bannon, 2014; Næss, [1974] 1989; 
Vetlesen, 2015). 
 
Perhaps paradoxically, the epoch seems to call for a non-anthropocentric discourse 
to guide the organisation of economies, and also “entails thinking on scales of space 
and time often considerably greater than usual” (Clark, 2015: 29). As local 
ecosystems continue to degrade and collapse, temporally they take the whole human 
civilisation closer to its end point; one micro-collapse at a time. Each species that 
becomes extinct and each language and the related knowledge systems that disappear 
constitutes an irreversible collapse to be cared about. The urgency to change the 
violent conduct of humans (in particular the affluent ones) increases, but 
simultaneously the rush to transform the economy also fades. That is, as the epoch 
proceeds, the window of opportunity for human-induced social change also narrows. 
This signifies that it is always more worthwhile to change the direction now rather 
than later (Heikkurinen, 2017). In other words, the closer the human species moves 
to a sudden depopulation, the slimmer the chances of human survival become. 
 
In terms of space, the human modifications in the biosphere continue to set spatial 
limitations on what can still be done to facilitate an even partial recovery of 
ecosystems, and hence to begin departing the Anthropocene epoch. The more the 
local ecosystems and their species are taken over by productivist human 
organisations – be they capitalist or socialist – the lower the possibility that 
ecosystems might heal. Every transformation of a non-human-made entity or process 
into a human-made version beyond the sustainable level is a step nearer to the tipping 
point (Heikkurinen, 2016; 2017). The state shift theory (Barnosky et al., 2012; 
Scheffer et al., 2009), for instance, suggests that once critical thresholds are passed, 
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ecosystems will undergo unanticipated and irreversible changes into radically altered 
biotic states, which are unlikely to be habitable for the species living in the 
Anthropocene, including most or all humans. 
 
The temporal dimension again sets further limitations on what can still be done, or 
in the case of the Anthropocene epoch, undone. As the critical thresholds for human 
survival are transgressed, the social change that might emerge is likely to have a 
limited effect on altering the course of those natural forces already set in motion by 
those privileged humans in charge of productivist organisations, such as 
corporations. While non-human processes certainly exhibit extraordinary recovery 
ability and resilience, much of the anthropogenic damage caused is irreversible. A 
lost species, for instance, will never return, and there are limits to how much humans 
can disturb and disrupt the biosphere (Rockström et al., 2009; Whiteman et al., 
2013). 
 
Despite the gloomy prospect of diversity loss and habitat destruction, it is both 
interesting and important to remain open to the idea of the emergence of a new 
economic organisation. Every act of peace directed towards the world and its 
inhabitants, whether human or non-human, enhances the quality of life and moves 
the prospect of extinctions further away toward another place and time. Hence, each 
action and each inaction contribute to the aspiration to sustain life, but of course as 
Gorz notes, “survival is not an end in itself” ([1975] 1980: 3-4). The world must be 
a place that is worth surviving for. 
 
To exit from the Anthropocene epoch, the organisation of the economy in line with 
the productivist assumption, which assumes that measurable productivity and growth 
are the desired purpose of human organisation, must be abandoned (see Heikkurinen 
et al., 2019). Finding a way to exit the Anthropocene epoch would be relatively 
simple if the problem were only about the wealthiest one percent of individual 
humans, or only about the recent developments in the Global North. Productivist 
economics (not limited to capitalism) have already involved most countries. 
Moreover, it may well be that the will to acquire power – to destroy, create, and 
control others – runs far deeper in the history of the species (Heikkurinen, 2017). 
Hence, the withdrawal from contemporary organisations should not be limited to 
capitalist modes, but should include any form of “growth society based upon the 
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development of productive forces” (Latouche, [2007] 2009: 89). The extent of 
withdrawal should of course depend on the amount of destruction occasioned, which 
could for instance be measured through changes in household income (Ulvila and 
Wilén, 2017). Finally, changing the way we discourse about the Anthropocene epoch 
is of vital importance for effective political action. 
 
4.2. Which discourses to exit? 
 
A major problem with most Anthropocene discourses is their inherent 
anthropocentrism. The natural science-based discourses (often extra-humankind) are 
not anthropocentric in the same manner as social science discourses are. In many 
cases, as reviewed above, the latter demonstrates “ontological anthropocentrism”, 
which suggests that the existence of entities in the world is dependent on humans, 
and for these discourses, it is difficult to accept a real epoch that does not reduce to 
language and human perception. This is not the kind of anthropocentrism natural 
sciences demonstrate. These discourses are neither anthropocentric in the sense of 
“epistemic anthropocentrism, which considers humans the only sources of value (or 
the only valuers)” or “moral anthropocentrism, which considers humans as the only 
locus of inherent moral value” (Heikkurinen, 2018: 7). The extra-humankind 
discourses are anthropocentric owing to their unit of analysis, that is, their focus on 
humankind as an agent. 
 
This kind of human-centeredness might be termed “agential anthropocentrism” and 
it can be problematic for exiting the epoch, because it overlooks historical context, 
class, and power relations and concentrations within the human species (including 
institutions in terms of rights, duties, privileges and liabilities). Instead, in these 
discourses the choice is made to investigate humankind as an agent in history. Such 
a position problematically overlooks the different ecological impacts of different 
economies.  
 
The “agentially” anthropocentric discourses correctly point out the consequences of 
humankind on the biosphere. However, in addition to the anthropogenics, the 
sociogenics of the epoch must be included in the Anthropocene discourse to outline 
an effective, interdisciplinary response. That is, integrating the extra-humankind and 
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intra-humankind discourses will create a better understanding of the causes and 
consequences of the epoch.  
 
In other words, while the anthropos is claimed to be too broad a discursive category, 
it is also too narrow a category. Merely focusing on intra-humankind issues neglects 
the relevance of extra-humankind analysis in both epistemological and axiological 
senses, as well as in agential terms. As a reality independent of humans is assumed 
(Bhaskar, 2012; Næss, ([1974] 1989; Vetlesen, 2015), a non-anthropocentric 
discourse is essential in the search for ecological economics and organisations. Non-
humans should not be excluded from having an ontological status, value in 
themselves or agential capacities (Heikkurinen et al., 2016). Hence it can be noted 
that anthropocentrism is problematic in all of its senses: ontological, 
epistemological, moral, and agential. Therefore, in order to imagine an alternative 
organisation of the economy, which is capable of leading a way out of the 
Anthropocene epoch, it is necessary to disengage from the anthropocentric 
Anthropocene discourses. 
 
The non-anthropocentric Anthropocene discourses could guide our new practices to 
lead a way out of the Anthropocene. These alternative discourses would be 
characterised by non-anthropocentrism and non-productivism. Rather than building 
new discourses on optimistic ideals closely connected to anthropocentrism, such 
discourse might emerge from cultural pessimism, or from ecological realism 
(Bonnedahl and Caramujo, 2018; Bonnedahl and Heikkurinen, 2019). By accepting 
the realities of the ongoing ecological destruction and the violence of the prevalent 
discourses on technologically mediated progress, a realisation may occur 
(Heidegger, ([1952-1962] 1977; [1959] 1966). However, “while we no longer 
believe that progress is a lawlike necessity in any sector of human life, it is still a 
possibility, which partly depends on our own attitudes and activities” (Niiniluoto, 
2011: 108). But what does it take to change the economy and human organisations 
beyond discourse? 
 
One idea to have found expression in the poetry of many civilizations and religious mythologies is that 
humanity can only attain wisdom which changes its way of life through suffering and ordeal. These 
ordeals can affect people in many different ways. In the life of the common people, they can be caused 
by famine, war, pestilence and great natural disasters. It is possible that we are standing on the brink of 
an age in which disasters will strike hard and pitilessly. Whether they will make us any the wiser in the 
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long term is debatable. On the other hand, these events could affect our conditions of life and, thereby, 
our way of living it. (von Wright, [1993] 2012: 125). 
 
In the Anthropocene epoch, disasters are already striking hard and many of our 
human and non-human fellow inhabitants of Earth are suffering accordingly; but 
such disasters have still not had a significant impact on productivist economies. 
Because it is not an option to wait for such an impact, it goes without saying that the 
current structures of power that enable the ecological destruction to continue should 
be dismantled. However, while the anthropocentric Anthropocene discourse that 
only focuses on humankind as an agent should be dismissed, it is a moot point 
whether in this task the term Anthropocene should be used at all. 
 
Clark (2015: 3) considers that “the term, already rather free from the constraints of 
geological terminology, may remain useful so long as its various but related uses 
retain a self-critical, even self-destructive force, even marking the term’s own 
equivocality as symptomatic of the kinds of blurring of would-be sharp conceptual, 
rhetorical, material and disciplinary borders in a newly recognized planetary 
context.” This article proposes that the term may be utilised, as long as the users do 
not succumb to the merely anthropocentric Anthropocene discourse. After all, 
despite its problems, the term “represents, for the first time, the demand made upon 
a species consciously to consider its impact as a totality upon the whole planet, the 
advent of a kind of new reflexivity as a species” (Clark, 2015: 16). Therefore, 
perhaps the ecological destruction of the biosphere opens opportunities for ways to 
understand and organise the economy, and particularly for the consuming and over-






The ‘Anthropocene’ is a contested term. This article aimed to reconcile the tensions 
in the scholarly debate by reviewing the Anthropocene discourses, and 
distinguishing them from the geological epoch. The article demonstrates how both 
natural and social science-based discourses are relevant in gaining a better 
understanding of the causes and consequences of the Anthropocene. They provide 
complementary knowledge on different units of analysis through discourses of 
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“extra-humankind” and “intra-humankind”. The extra-humankind discourses on the 
Anthropocene increase our understanding regarding the human place in the 
biosphere, while the intra-humankind discourses provide a more contextual 
understanding of the ecological crisis. Instead of continuing the paradigmatic tug-
of-war, Anthropocene discourses should move towards integration. Moreover, while 
discourses are key to effective political action, it should be acknowledged that the 
epoch does not reduce to any linguistic means. We conclude that in order to exit the 
Anthropocene epoch, anthropocentric discourses on the Anthropocene should be 
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